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I. Introduction 
Most online market and sharing places rely on reputation building systems to foster trust and 
trustworthiness on their platforms. However, such systems are less than perfect and conflicts still arise 
(Ockenfels and Resnick, 2012). Many online marketplaces employ conflict resolution systems to manage 
such conflicts. A widely used example are feedback withdrawal mechanisms, which exploit the 
infrastructure of existing feedback systems, and offer feedback revision if one or both trading partners are 
dissatisfied with the trading outcome. The idea is that the possibility of having one’s received negative 
feedback removed incentivizes make-good behavior, and thus may eventually lead to everybody’s 
satisfaction. Feedback withdrawal rules, however, may also invite strategic gaming. Using data from the 
laboratory and the field, Bolton et al. (2018) show how the standard feedback withdrawal mechanism can 
backfire and hamper feedback informativeness and market efficiency. 
The question that arises is how to design a feedback withdrawal mechanism that provides incentives to 
resolve conflict without inviting strategic gaming and distorting feedback information. Starting from the 
commonly used – yet flawed – feedback withdrawal mechanism, we propose a minimal design change, 
making the final decision to withdraw feedback unilateral instead of mutual. Our laboratory experiment 
demonstrates how the slightly adapted mechanism undoes the original finding that withdrawal mechanisms 
significantly reduce feedback informativeness and market efficiency. The reason is that the new mechanism 
substantially curbs incentives to give feedback strategically, and in this way allows traders to use the 
feedback revision option as a device to more successfully coordinate expectations between buyers and 
sellers. 
We contribute to a growing theoretical, experimental, and empirical literature on reputation building 
and the market design of feedback systems. A quickly increasing number of studies investigate the role of 
feedback systems for trader cooperation and market efficiency (see Chen at al., 2019 and Tadelis, 2016, for 
surveys). Yet, much less attention has been given to the design of conflict resolution mechanisms. 
Exceptions include Deck and Farmer (2007) who look into arbitration in bargaining over an uncertain value, 
Bolton and Katok (1996) who link the negative effect of arbitration on negotiation outcomes to slower 
learning, Ashenfelter et al. (1992) who investigate how different arbitration procedures affect bargaining 
outcomes, and Shavell (1995) who looks into binding arbitration as an alternative to trial before court. All 
these studies are concerned with offline arbitration, e.g. labor market disputes. With respect to online 
dispute resolution, Vasalou et al. (2008) investigate the effect of apologies to repair trust in one-off online 
interactions. Bolton et al. (2018), the departure point of our study, explore strategic behavior in eBay’s 
mutual feedback withdrawal mechanism. We complement this literature by showing how a small tweak in 
the market design of a feedback-based conflict resolution mechanisms can achieve the objective of 
coordination and trade facilitation without distorting incentives in feedback giving. 
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In Section I we describe our experimental design and procedures. Section II develops our two main 
hypotheses. Section III presents our experimental results, and Section IV concludes. The Appendix includes 
robustness checks, experiment instructions, and additional analyses of the experimental data. 
 
II. Experimental Design and Procedures 
We compare three feedback withdrawal mechanisms. Each mechanism is placed in the same market 
place with two-sided moral hazard (both buyer and seller) and a two-sided feedback system. Participants 
interact as buyers and sellers for 60 rounds. Table 1 below displays the sequence of stage decisions taken 
in each round. Each round starts with a choice to engage in a trade (or not) by both traders. If one or both 
trading partners decide not to trade, seller and buyer receive their outside option of 100 ECU and the round 
ends. Otherwise, buyer and seller enter the transaction phase. The buyer decides whether or not to make the 
payment P1 ∊ {0,100} while simultaneously the seller decides on the level of quality Q1 of the product 
(between 0% and 100%). Then both parties are informed about the decisions of their respective trading 
partner and submit feedback on the transaction. Feedback can be either positive or negative. After both 
trading partners are informed about their feedback, they receive the opportunity to make good.  Specifically, 
if the buyer had not paid yet (P1 = 0), then he receives another chance to pay, P2 ∊ {0,100} ≥ P1. The seller 
may improve upon her initial quality with Q2 ≥ Q1. 
 
TABLE 1: PROCEDURE IN EACH ROUND OF THE EXPERIMENT 
Stage Feedback System 
Feedback 
displayed 
Sum of transaction partner’s positive and negative feedback in previous 
rounds 
Trade Buyer and seller simultaneously decide whether to trade or not. If one doesn’t 
agree, the round ends with πB = 100 and πS = 100. 
Transaction Buyer decides whether or not to pay 100 ECU. Seller simultaneously decides 
on Quality Q1 with 0 ≤ Q1 ≤ 100%.  
 Feedback  Buyer and seller simultaneously give either positive or negative feedback. 
Make-good  If buyer has not made the payment yet, then he can pay now; seller 
simultaneously decides on quality Q2 with Q1 ≤ Q2 ≤ 100%. 
Feedback 
withdrawal 
noFW: No feedback withdrawal/revision. 
muFW: Both trading partners are asked to vote for feedback withdrawal. If 
both traders agree, negative feedback is changed to positive feedback. 
uniFW: Both trading partners are asked to vote for feedback revision option. 
If both traders agree, they simultaneously and independently decide whether 
they want to change their negative feedback to a positive feedback. 
Payoffs πB= 100 – PricePaid + Q2 * 3,  πS= 100 + PricePaid – Q2 
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The three treatments of the experiment differ only in the last stage, concerning feedback withdrawal. 
In treatment noFW, there is no such stage. In treatment muFW, if there was at least one negative feedback, 
both trading partners are asked whether they agree to withdraw any negative feedback and make it positive. 
If, and only if, both agree, then both feedbacks are made positive. In treatment uniFW, both trading partners 
are asked whether they agree to allow a revision of feedback. If both agree, then both trading partners can 
unilaterally withdraw their negative feedback, or not. (In no treatment can positive initial feedback be made 
negative.) 
All data was collected in the Cologne Laboratory for Economic Research, and participants were 
students from the University of Cologne recruited via ORSEE (Greiner 2015). The experiment was 
programmed in zTree (Fischbacher 2007). Average payoffs were about EUR 20 plus a show-up fee of EUR 
2.50. The original Bolton et al. (2018) sessions involved 128 participants, with 2 sessions each for 
conditions noFW and muFW. The new sessions used 192 participants, with 3 sessions each for treatments 
noFW and uniFW. Sessions comprised 32 participants each, who were assigned to matching groups of 8 
participants. Thus, our analysis relies on 20 independent markets/matching groups in the baseline noFW, 8 
matching groups in muFW, and 12 matching groups in uniFW. In our analysis we pool data from Bolton et 
al. (2018) with data from the new experiment sessions conducted between June and November 2017. 
  
III. Two hypotheses 
The main flaw in muFW stems from the feedback withdrawal being required to be mutual, such that 
either all or none of the negative feedbacks are withdrawn. As long as negative feedback is costly, all traders 
who receive a negative feedback in the feedback stage will rationally and selfishly agree to mutually 
withdraw feedback, irrespective of whether this distorts feedback information, in order to make sure that 
one’s own reputation does not get spoiled. Yet, at the same time, the incentive to cooperate vanishes, 
because even defecting traders can evade negative feedback by leaving a negative feedback themselves and 
thus making the opponent agree on feedback withdrawal. As a result, reputation information becomes less 
informative thereby reducing incentives for cooperation.1  
Unilateral feedback withdrawal (uniFW) eliminates this flaw, because one’s decision to withdraw 
feedback cannot affect one’s own reputation. As a result, the incentives for creating ‘honest’ reputation 
information are the same in uniFW and noFW, as summarized by hypothesis H1. 
 
1 A model in Bolton et al. (2018), section 2, formalizes this line of reasoning. In synopsis: Even under most favorable conditions 
for cooperation, there can be no cooperation in equilibrium under mutual feedback withdrawal (muFW). The main assumptions of 
the model are three: (1) the future is sufficiently important, so that traders want to avoid receiving negative feedback; (2) traders’ 
feedback is ‘honest’ as long as there are no monetary incentives to strategically submit biased feedback; and (3) conflict cannot 
arise due to coordination problems (which can happen when, for example, the buyer and seller differ in their expectations about 
what constitutes a ‘satisfactory quality level’). 
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H1: uniFW repairs muFW: The negative effects of mutual feedback withdrawal on trading behavior and 
feedback informativeness vanish if feedback withdrawal becomes unilateral. 
 
If we establish that uniFW can repair muFW, we can then ask whether it serves to improve the 
performance of an otherwise identical reputation system with no withdrawal (noFW). This is an important 
question because simple models of reputation giving, including the one presented in Bolton et al. (2018), 
predict equivalent trading and feedback behavior in the noFW and uniFW conditions:  Because feedback in 
both conditions is equally predicted to be honest, the reputation systems should, in theory, yield the same 
incentives to be cooperative (see also Footnote 1). 
To put the quandary in a more empirical context, there is ample evidence to show that making 
information about past trade behavior public effects an increase in trust (e.g., Duffy and Feltovich 2002, 
2006, Bolton et al. 2004, Bohnet and Huck 2004, Bohnet et al. 2005, Brown and Zehnder 2007, Bracht and 
Feltovich 2009, Charness et al. 2011, Huck et al. 2010, 2012, Duffy et al. 2013). So, if the noFW and uniFW 
systems offer the same incentive to give honest feedback, what reason is there to expect better trading 
outcomes in the latter system? 
The answer is that the theoretical arguments rely on an implicit assumption, that there is no coordination 
failure: Traders’ beliefs about what trading patterns to expect from each other to obtain a positive feedback 
are assumed to be mutually consistent. This, however, appears unlikely (see Bolton et al., forthcoming, for 
a discussion), and indeed one could argue that coordination of expectations is one of the major benefits of 
any successful conflict resolution system. In our context, for instance, coordination failure may arise with 
respect to a seller’s expectation about what quality level makes the buyer sufficiently happy to leave a 
positive feedback. Some might think that any positive quality level signals some level of trust and kindness 
and thus should be reciprocated by a positive feedback; others may believe that any level below the quality 
that guarantees an equal split of payoffs is unfair and must thus be punished; others might argue that any 
level that does not maximize total payoffs deserves a negative feedback; and still others might take a hybrid 
perspective. A chance to revise one’s behavior and feedback in an organized conflict resolution process, 
even as minimalistic as implemented by uniFW, might help traders to better coordinate these expectations. 
Doing so might reduce future trading risk and improve cooperation.  
 
H2: uniFW improves coordination over noFW: uniFW reduces uncertainty and facilitates coordination of 
expectations, implying positive effects on trader cooperation. 
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IV. Results2 
 
IV.1 uniFW does not reduce payments and quality like muFW does 
Figure 1 below shows payment frequencies and average quality choices across our three treatments 
(conditional on there being trade).3 Payments represent market merchandise revenues and are often a major 
concern of real-world market platforms which typically earn a share of these. The level of product quality 
traded scales the gains from trade, determining market efficiency. We observe strong treatment effects on 
the frequency of payments/market revenue. Compared to no feedback withdrawal, the feedback withdrawal 
mechanism muFW used in practice reduces the likelihood of initial (eventual) payment by 20 (12) 
percentage points. In contrast, the proposed uniFW mechanism, which implements but a small change 
compared to muFW, increases the likelihood of initial (eventual) payment by 11 (12) percentage points.   
 
 
FIGURE 1: AVERAGE PAYMENT/REVENUES AND QUALITY/EFFICIENCY 
CONDITIONAL ON TRADE, ACROSS THE THREE TREATMENTS 
 
 
2 We focus our analysis on rounds 11 to 50, studying a running system rather than start-up or end-game effects. We provide 
more in-depth analyses in Appendix A and refer to them in this text where appropriate. In particular, in Appendix A.1 we present 
a direct comparison of the noFW baseline condition between the original Bolton et al. (2018) data and our new replication. We 
observe very similar behavioral pattern across original and replication. We do not find statistically significant differences at the 5% 
level for any of the major variables of interest (Wilcoxon matched pairs tests based on independent matching groups). We detect a 
weakly significant effect (at the 10% level) for seller profits as well as the likelihood to agree to trade, both being lower in the 
replication sessions than in the original sessions. All statistics provided below rely on the pooled data. Conclusions are largely the 
same when using only original baseline sessions, and somewhat more favorable for the uniFW system when using only the new 
replication sessions. 
3 The probability of entering trade in the three treatments is 74% in noFW, 81% in muFW, and 81% in uniFW. The lower number 
for the noFW control condition is mainly driven by the (weakly significantly) lower likelihood of trade in the new replication 
sessions compared to the older sessions (see previous footnote). When considering payment and quality unconditional on trade, 
these differences in trade likelihood somewhat mitigate the negative effects of muFW and increase the positive effects of uniFW. 
The comparison of uniFW and muFW however is unaffected, in particular since they show almost identical trade frequencies.  
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TABLE 2: REGRESSIONS OF PROBABILITY OF PAYMENT AND QUALITY  
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Model type Probit Tobit Probit Tobit 
Dependent Initial Initial Final Final 
 Payment Quality Payment Quality 
     
Constant  0.517***  0.512*** 
  [0.024]  [0.021] 
     
Round    -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.003*** 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
     
muFW -0.156** -0.120** -0.086 -0.058 
 [0.074] [0.053] [0.059] [0.047] 
     
uniFW 0.130*** -0.028 0.148*** 0.032 
 [0.049] [0.045] [0.044] [0.025] 
     
N 4945 4945 4945 4945 
LL -2520.1 -1546.8 -2209.4 -937.7 
Censoring Left 
(Non) Right  
874 
(3965) 106  
660 
(4179) 106 
     
Post-estimation test 
muFW = uniFW, p-value 0.0002 0.1544 0.0002 0.0598 
Notes: Probit coefficent estimates are stated as average marginal effects dy/dx. Quality is 
censored at 0 and 1. Regressions are based on data from rounds 11-50 (omitting start and end 
effects). Robust standard errors are clustered at the level of independent matching groups. *, **, 
and ** denote significance levels 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
The Probit regressions reported in Table 2 Models (1) and (3) support these observations statistically. 
The differences in initial payment frequencies are highly significant. For eventual payment frequency, the 
differences between uniFW and the other two treatments reach significance at the 1% level, while the 
comparison between noFW and muFW is not statistically significant. (Non-parametric Wilcoxon Ranksum 
tests based on independent matching group averages support these conclusions.4) 
For initial product quality (market efficiency), we observe a reduction by 11 percentage points with the 
muFW mechanism compared to no feedback withdrawal, which Model (2) in Table 2 shows to be 
statistically significant. The small reduction by 3 percentage points in treatment uniFW is statistically not 
significant. For eventual quality, the negative effect of treatment muFW is 6 percentage points, while 
 
4 P-values for noFW vs. muFW, noFW vs. uniFW, and muFW vs. uniFW are 0.075, 0.011, and 0.003, respectively, in terms of 
initial payment frequencies, and 0.309, 0.006, and 0.004, respectively, in terms of eventual payment frequencies. 
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treatment uniFW yields an increase in quality of 4 percentage points. Both differences are not statistically 
significant. However, the eventual 10%-difference between muFW and uniFW is statistically weakly 
significant at the 10%-level (see post-estimation test in Table 2 Model (4)).5 
In summary, while muFW creates negative effects on market revenues and market efficiency (though 
the latter effect is not significant when considering eventual quality), uniFW does not come with these costs, 
and even has a considerable positive effect in terms of payments/market revenues. In direct comparisons, 
uniFW outperforms muFW both in terms of payment and quality. We interpret this evidence as strong 
support for the trading terms portion of Hypothesis 1. We now turn to evaluating the second part of that 
hypothesis, regarding strategic feedback behavior and information distortion. 
 
IV.2 uniFW does not distort feedback like muFW does 
Figure 2 displays the frequency of positive feedback conditional the trading partner’s behavior 
(eventual payment or quality choice), for all three treatments. The gray bars display data from the noFW 
treatment. We observe that the higher the quality, the larger is the likelihood of positive feedback, with a 
zero-quality yielding a positive feedback in only 8% of the transactions and a 51-100% quality resulting in 
a positive feedback in 90% of the cases. A similar trend is observed for sellers’ feedback to buyers, where 
no payment receives a positive feedback only in 11% of the cases while a payment results in positive 
feedback in 88% of the cases. 
FIGURE 2: EVENTUAL FEEDBACK CONDITIONAL 
ON TRADING PARTNER’S BEHAVIOR 
  
 
5 Results from non-parametric Wilcoxon Ranksum tests based on independent matching group averages are mostly consistent 
with the regression results. P-values for noFW vs. muFW, noFW vs. uniFW, and muFW vs. uniFW are 0.025, 0.559, and 0.076, 
respectively, in terms of initial quality, and 0.075, 0.350, and 0.076, respectively, in terms of eventual quality. 
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The black bars show the distortion in feedback informativeness resulting from muFW. In the face of 
incentives for strategic feedback behavior, 49% of the sellers who delivered a zero quality and 50% of 
buyers who do not pay nevertheless end up with a positive feedback. Thus, feedback in muFW is less 
informative in the sense of being less correlated with actual behavior than feedback in noFW. In the uniFW 
system (white bars), which mitigates the strategic feedback gaming incentives, this information distortion 
disappears, and eventual feedback conditional on eventual payment and quality resembles the data from a 
system without any feedback withdrawal possibilities.  
Regressions reported in Table 3 below statistically support these conclusions. In noFW, feedback by 
the transaction partner is strongly correlated with the trader’s behavior (quality/payment). In muFW, 
however, the probability of an unconditional positive feedback increases significantly, while the relation to 
the underlying quality and payment decisions is significantly reduced. No such effects are observed in 
treatment uniFW. In other words, the correlations between feedback and trader behavior are significantly 
reduced in treatment muFW but not in treatment uniFW.6 This confirms the informativeness part of 
Hypothesis 1, in that muFW distorts feedback information but uniFW does not. 
 
TABLE 3: PROBIT REGRESSIONS OF POSITIVE FEEDBACK ON 
QUALITY/PAYMENT AND TREATMENT INDICATORS 
Dependent: 
Positive feedback 
B->S FB 
is pos 
 S->B FB 
is pos 
 
 (1)  (2)  
     
Round    0.001 [0.001] -0.001 [0.001] 
Quality/Payment 0.011*** [0.001] 0.749*** [0.036] 
     
muFW 0.308*** [0.064] 0.270*** [0.048] 
muFW × Quality/Payment -0.007*** [0.002] -0.280*** [0.055] 
     
uniFW -0.055 [0.112] -0.051 [0.061] 
uniFW × Quality/Payment 0.002 [0.003] 0.022 [0.077] 
     
N 4945  4945  
LL -2205.2  -1965.3  
Post-estimation test 
muFW = uniFW, p-value 0.0003 
 
0.0000 
 
Notes: The table reports average marginal effects dy/dx. Regressions are based on data from 
rounds 11-50 (omitting start and end effects). Robust standard errors are clustered at the level of 
independent matching groups. *, **, and ** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. 
 
6 In Appendix A.2 we provide a similar analysis, using non-parametric Wilcoxon rank sum tests based on correlations between 
feedback and quality/payment calculated at the independent matching group level. 
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The mitigated distortion of feedback in uniFW as compared to muFW is due to reduced incentives for 
strategic gaming of the feedback and withdrawal rules. To further illustrate this, Appendix A.3 shows that 
both muFW- and uniFW-traders condition withdrawal of negative feedback on make-good behavior when 
not threatened by a negative feedback themselves. When having received a negative feedback themselves, 
behavior becomes different in the two markets. In muFW making up does not matter anymore, and traders 
agree to withdrawal unconditionally, making feedback and withdrawal losing its bite. In uniFW, however, 
the conditionality is coming back in the unilateral withdrawal stage, preserving incentives to make-good in 
all cases. As one result, muFW-traders are more likely to give preemptive negative feedback in order to 
extort a withdrawal decision, something that is not possible under uniFW. 
 
IV.3 uniFW reduces variance in payoffs compared to noFW and muFW 
In order to assess the strategic uncertainty faced by buyers and sellers – and thus the scope for 
coordination failure – in our different markets, we calculate the standard deviation of buyer and seller round 
profits (conditional on entering trade) within each matching group. We also calculate these numbers for 
trusting buyers, who sent payment in the initial transaction phase, and trusting sellers, who delivered a 
quality of more or equal to 50% in the initial phase. We then conducted Wilcoxon Ranksum tests to assess 
whether the distributions of these standard deviations differ between treatments. Table 4 below lists the 
averages of the calculated standard deviations across all matching groups of the respective treatments along 
with the corresponding p-values. 
 
TABLE 4: BUYER AND SELLER PROFITS AND THEIR AVERAGE STANDARD DEVIATIONS ACROSS 
INDEPENDENT MATCHING GROUPS, AND WILCOXON RANKSUM RESULTS 
Average round payoffs noFW muFW uniFW 
All buyers 143.0 142.6 142.3 
All sellers 131.1 127.0 140.3 
Buyers who paid initially 141.9 142.1 144.8 
Sellers who sent initial quality >=50% 128.6 123.5 136.2 
    
Average Standard Deviation noFW muFW uniFW 
All buyers 55.89 60.16 40.34 
All sellers 35.67 37.35 25.77 
Buyers who paid initially 48.42 56.36 34.20 
Sellers who sent initial quality >=50% 30.81 31.46 18.45 
    
P-values from Wilcoxon rank sum tests 
noFW vs. 
muFW 
noFW vs. 
uniFW 
muFW vs. 
uniFW 
All buyers 0.222 0.013 0.006 
All sellers 0.576 0.007 0.001 
Buyers who paid initially 0.204 0.032 0.017 
Sellers who sent initial quality >=50% 0.799 0.002 0.017 
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As the middle part of Table 4 shows, we find that uniFW leads to a lower variation in (expected) round 
payoffs not just in comparison to the strategically problematic muFW mechanism, but also to the system 
without any feedback withdrawal mechanism (noFW). And this particularly holds for initially trusting 
buyers and sellers. The test results presented in the lower part of Table 4 confirm that standard deviations 
for all inspected groups are lower in uniFW than in noFW and muFW, with no statistically significant 
difference between the latter two. At the same time, we observe that buyer and seller profits in uniFW are 
equal to or even larger than in noFW and muFW. Specifically, seller profits (over all sellers) in uniFW 
outperform both noFW and muFW (p = 0.0176 and 0.0136, respectively), while the other differences are 
not significant at the p = 0.1 level.   
We conclude that the strategic uncertainty of a trader with respect to expected profits from entering a 
transaction with a trading partner is significantly reduced in uniFW compared to when no feedback 
withdrawal system is present (or when muFW is at work). Thus, we confirm Hypothesis 2 that uniFW can 
reduce uncertainty and facilitate expectation coordination. 
 
V. Conclusion 
We experimentally compare two-sided markets with three different conflict resolution systems: one 
where no such system exists (noFW), one that employs a standard mutual feedback withdrawal (muFW, 
where only all negative feedback can be withdrawn at once upon mutual agreement), and one that uses a 
slightly modified system (uniFW, where both trading partners mutually agree to let each other withdraw 
feedback unilaterally). We find that in contrast to muFW, the uniFW option neither reduces market 
efficiency nor distorts feedback informativeness. Rather, it facilitates the coordination of expectations by 
reducing traders’ strategic uncertainty. It also positively affects market merchandise revenues, which are 
often important to real-world market platform profitability.  
While the work here speaks directly to a problem with online dispute resolution mechanisms, the results 
speak indirectly to problems common to many offline dispute resolution mechanisms, a problem long 
known to researchers studying offline arbitration (Ashenfelter 2009); namely, having dispute resolution 
available tends to reduce the incentives for actors to solve a problem in the first place (prior to using dispute 
resolution). In other words, the availability of dispute resolution tends to reduce the number of voluntary 
settlements we would otherwise see, and the additional arbitrated outcomes may be distorted relative to the 
voluntary settlements they displace. The results here show that a careful assessment of the dispute resolution 
rules can turn up design modifications in those rules that mitigate the incentive distortion that causes these 
problems in the first place. Whether such design modifications can be successfully employed in offline 
mechanisms is therefore an interesting avenue for further research. 
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Appendix A. Further analysis, tables, and figures 
 
Appendix A.1 Comparison between noFW original and replication sessions 
In Table A.1.1 we compare the baseline data from original Bolton et al (2018) sessions with the data from 
our baseline replication sessions, using Wilcoxon Ranksum tests based on independent matching group 
averages. We generally find no statistically significant differences between the two sets of sessions, with 
two exceptions: The frequency of trade and the average seller profit are weakly significantly lower in the 
replication sessions than in the original sessions (p=0.076 and p=0.070, respectively). These significant 
results however have to be evaluated on the background of multiple hypothesis testing. A Bonferroni 
correction for eight concurrent hypothesis tests would render all p-values insignificant. 
 
TABLE A.1.1: MAIN AGGREGATE OUTCOME VARIABLES OF INTERESTS FOR ORIGINAL AND REPLICATION 
NOFW SESSIONS, AND RESULTS FROM WILCOXON RANKSUM TESTS 
 Original 
sessions 
Replication 
sessions 
Wilcoxon 
Ranksum 
p-value 
Frequency of trade 0.801 0.693 0.076* 
Frequency of initial payment 0.785 0.722 0.355 
Frequency of eventual payment 0.816 0.754 0.165 
Avg. initial quality 42.2% 42.3% 0.488 
Avg. eventual quality 42.4% 43.3% 0.316 
Avg. profit 134.4 130.2 0.247 
Avg. buyer profit 136.5 137.5 0.758 
Avg. seller profit 132.3 122.9 0.070* 
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Appendix A.2 Assessing the informativeness of eventual feedback across treatments 
A further series of non-parametric statistical tests supports the conclusion that compared to noFW, muFW 
leads to information distortion while uniFW does not. Wilcoxon Ranksum tests based in independent 
matching group averages yield that the frequencies of positive feedbacks after zero quality / no payment 
are significantly different in the muFW treatment compared to noFW and uniFW, with no differences 
between the latter. Obtained p-values for noFW vs. muFW, noFW vs. uniFW, and muFW vs. uniFW are 
0.0001, 0.4676, and 0.0001, respectively, for 0% quality, and 0.0001, 0.3514, and 0.0002, respectively, for 
no payment. Probit models regressing the likelihood of a positive feedback when there is 0% quality / no 
payment on treatment dummies yield exactly the same conclusions.  
For further support, we compute and compare the correlations between behavior (payment/quality) and 
eventually received feedback. The point-biserial correlation between the continuous variable quality and 
the dichotomous variable feedback equals 0.822, 0.731, and 0.891 in treatments noFW, muFW, and uniFW, 
respectively. Cramer’s V as a measure of correlation between the two dichotomous variables payment and 
feedback is 0.698, 0.401, and 0.519 for treatments noFW, muFW, and uniFW, respectively. Wilcoxon 
Ranksum tests that are based on these correlations at the matching group level confirm that these differences 
in correlations are statistically significant (except for the comparison of the payment-feedback correlation 
between treatments muFW and uniFW). P-values for noFW vs. muFW, noFW vs. uniFW, and muFW vs. 
uniFW are 0.0933, 0.0391, and 0.0055, respectively, for comparing correlations between quality and 
feedback, and 0.0008, 0.0390 and 0.1167, respectively, for comparing correlations between payment and 
feedback. 
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Appendix A.3 Detailed description and analysis of feedback behavior 
 
In this appendix, we discuss the observed pattern of feedback and withdrawal behavior in the three 
treatments (in particular in the two feedback withdrawal treatments muFW and uniFW) in more detail. 
Figure A.3.1 shows the pattern of initial feedback behavior (as opposed to eventual feedback patterns) in 
the three treatments. We observe that buyers in muFW are more likely to withhold positive feedback for 
high quality, compared to the other two systems, presumably in order to not give away their negotiation 
power in the subsequent withdrawal stage. For sellers, we observe that they are more likely to withhold 
positive feedback for an initial payment in both withdrawal systems. While in muFW sellers may have 
similar strategic reasons as buyers for that, sellers in uniFW may also want to protect themselves against 
buyers extracting “unfairly high” quality from them in the next stage. 
 
FIGURE A.3.1: INITIAL FEEDBACK CONDITIONAL 
ON TRADING PARTNER’S BEHAVIOR 
 
 
Table A.3.1 show the detailed pattern of feedback giving and underlying buyer and seller behavior. Figure 
A.3.2 visualizes the feedback conversion through withdrawal in the three different treatments. We observe 
that first, initial feedback distributions vary markedly between the three treatments, especially in the share 
of mutually positive feedback, reflecting the different initial payment and quality choices in the three 
treatments, as well as strategic considerations. Second, while there is little make-good in the system without 
feedback withdrawal (noFW), there is considerable make-good behavior in two feedback withdrawal 
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treatments (muFW and uniFW), almost exclusively by those who have received an initial negative feedback. 
Make-good is more prevalent for the traders with negative feedback when feedback was asymmetric, i.e. 
the other trader received a positive feedback. And third, in both muFW and uniFW, when initial feedback 
was asymmetric, the “weak party” (i.e. the one who received the negative feedback) almost always also 
agrees to (the option of) have feedback withdrawn. In uniFW, when feedback was asymmetric, those who 
agree to withdraw also typically withdraw in the end, such that there is no big difference between the 
agreement to allow withdrawal and the act of withdrawal. When feedback was symmetrically negative, 
however, then agreement to withdrawal is much higher (since also the own feedback is on the line), but 
only half of affected buyers and sellers then also unilaterally withdraw the other’s feedback. Thus, the 
mutual agreement to withdraw and the unilateral act to withdraw are indeed treated differently. The fourth 
observation, highlighted both by Table A.3.1 and Figure A.3.2, is that even though the three different 
treatments yield very different initial feedback distributions and feature quite different make-good and 
feedback-withdrawal pattern, the final distributions of feedback (see last column of Table A.3.1 and right 
side of Figure A.3.2) are very similar across the three treatments. That is, the actually observed distribution 
of feedback in a feedback system may tell us very little about underlying market and feedback behavior, a 
caveat to keep in mind when examining empirical data collected on real-world platforms. 
 
FIGURE A.3.2: FEEDBACK TRANSFORMATION THROUGH WITHDRAWAL, FOR ALL THREE TREATMENTS 
 
 
noFW
muFW
uniFW
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TABLE A.3.1: FEEDBACK, MAKE-GOOD AND WITHDRAWAL FREQUENCIES AS WELL AS INITIAL AND 
EVENTUAL FEEDBACK DISTRIBUTIONS ACROSS THE THREE TREATMENTS 
Treatment & 
Given FB 
FB 
Freq. 
P & Q 
before 
make-
good 
P & Q 
after 
make-
good 
Freq. of 
make-
good 
Vote for 
withdrawal 
(opportunity) 
Revise 
Evtl. 
FB 
Freq. 
noFW 
 B->S pos, S->B pos 59% 
P: 0.97  
Q: 0.52 
P: 0.97  
Q: 0.52 
P: 8%  
Q: 8% - - 59% 
 B->S neg, S->B pos 14% 
P: 0.94  
Q: 0.31 
P: 0.94  
Q: 0.31 
P: 10%  
Q: 7% - - 14% 
 B->S pos, S->B neg 11% 
P: 0.27  
Q: 0.46 
P: 0.41  
Q: 0.46 
P: 18% 
Q: 8% - - 11% 
 B->S neg, S->B neg 16% 
P: 0.21  
Q: 0.17 
P: 0.29  
Q: 0.18 
P: 10% 
Q: 7% - - 16% 
muFW        
 B->S pos, S->B pos 21% 
P: 0.98  
Q: 0.59 
P: 0.99  
Q: 0.59 
P: 25%  
Q: 1% - - 67% 
 B->S neg, S->B pos 24% 
P: 0.96  
Q: 0.35 
P: 0.96  
Q: 0.44 
P: 0%  
Q: 68% 
B: 62% S: 99% 
Both: 61% - 9% 
 B->S pos, S->B neg 8% 
P: 0.14  
Q: 0.42 
P: 0.61  
Q: 0.43 
P: 54% 
Q: 9% 
B: 97% S: 51% 
Both: 49% - 4% 
 B->S neg, S->B neg 47% 
P: 0.26  
Q: 0.19 
P: 0.43  
Q: 0.26 
P: 22% 
Q: 34% 
B: 73% S: 82% 
Both: 57% - 20% 
uniFW        
 B->S pos, S->B pos 44% 
P: 1.00 
Q: 0.52 
P: 1.00  
Q: 0.52 
P: -  
Q: 0% - - 69% 
 B->S neg, S->B pos 22% 
P: 0.98  
Q: 0.28 
P: 0.98  
Q: 0.46 
P: 14%  
Q: 68% 
B: 66% S: 98% 
Both: 66% B: 95% 10% 
 B->S pos, S->B neg 11% 
P: 0.75  
Q: 0.46 
P: 0.94  
Q: 0.46 
P: 75% 
Q: 6% 
B: 91% S: 64% 
Both: 60% S: 96% 7% 
 B->S neg, S->B neg 23% 
P: 0.62  
Q: 0.26 
P: 0.71  
Q: 0.34 
P: 23% 
Q: 49% 
B: 78% S: 80% 
Both: 63% 
B: 53%, S: 48% 
Both: 34% 14% 
 
 
Table A.3.2 examines strategic behavior in the feedback withdrawal process after having given a negative 
feedback in the treatments muFW and uniFW. The regressions reported in Table A.3.3 provide supporting 
statistical evidence.  
Under muFW, when a buyer did not cooperate at all (i.e. did not pay initially and also did not make good), 
then a seller who has received a positive feedback herself withdraws only in 16% of the cases, while she 
withdraws in 71% of the cases when she also has a negative feedback on her back. Under uniFW, this 
difference disappears, with only 3% / 10% of sellers with a positive/negative feedback eventually 
withdrawing, respectively. We observe very similar pattern for the opposite side of the market, for 
withdrawal behavior towards a seller who delivered quality of less than 50% and did not improve upon this 
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in the make-good stage. The negative feedback of these sellers is withdrawn in muFW in only 14% of the 
cases when the buyer had received a positive feedback, but in 60% of the cases when the buyer had received 
a negative feedback himself. Once again, this difference disappears in treatment uniFW where towards such 
an uncooperative seller it does not make a difference whether the buyer has received a positive or negative 
feedback herself (with withdrawal frequencies of 0% and 4%, respectively). These data are strong evidence 
that withdrawal behavior is strategic and highly dependent on own received feedback in muFW, while such 
considerations do not play a role in uniFW. 
However, we also observe a difference in withdrawal behavior from (at least initially) uncooperative traders 
towards cooperative trading partners. A seller with an initially negative feedback agrees to withdraw an 
(unfair) negative feedback towards an initially paying buyer in 96% of the cases in muFW, but eventually 
withdraws only in 49% of the cases in uniFW. Once again we see similar patterns on the other market side, 
with the corresponding eventual withdrawal frequencies of a buyer with negative feedback towards a 
cooperative seller with an unfair negative feedback being 100% and 41% in treatments muFW and uniFW, 
respectively. This indicates that uniFW may also have some caveats, something that was not anticipated by 
our theoretical reasoning where we assumed honest feedback behavior absent any other monetary motives. 
However, as our analysis of aggregate behavior shows, this caveat may not have much weight on overall 
market behavior. 
  
TABLE A.3.2: FEEDBACK WITHDRAWAL FREQUENCIES 
CONDITIONAL ON INITIAL COOPERATION AND MAKE-GOOD 
Frequency of seller’s withdrawal 
muFW  uniFW 
Seller received  Seller received 
neg pos  neg pos 
Buyer paid initially 96% 82%  49% 71% 
Buyer did not pay and made good 96% 70%  45% 40% 
Buyer did not pay and did not make good 71% 16%  3% 10% 
Frequency of buyer’s withdrawal 
muFW  uniFW 
Buyer received  Buyer received 
neg pos  neg pos 
Seller delivered Q1≥50% and improved 100% 77%  41% 85% 
Seller delivered Q1≥50% and did not 
improve 98% 52% 
 28% 34% 
Seller delivered Q1<50% and improved 83% 73%  64% 80% 
Seller delivered Q1<50% and did not 
improve 60% 14% 
 4% 0% 
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In Table A.3.3 we report results from Probit regressions predicting the decision of (agreeing to) withdraw 
a negative feedback based on whether the trading partner had improved their initial payment/quality choice 
and whether the trader had received a negative feedback herself. For muFW, we find (as reported in Bolton 
et al., 2018) that when the trader has not received a negative feedback herself, then withdrawal is strongly 
conditioned on whether the partner has made good or not. On the other hand, when the trader has received 
a negative feedback herself, then there is a higher likelihood that the feedback is withdrawn unconditionally, 
with the correlation between withdrawal and make-good being significantly reduced. 
Under uniFW, we have a two-step decision: the choice to agree to allow feedback withdrawal, and the 
choice to actually unilaterally withdraw the given feedback. As we observed above when discussing Table 
A.3.1, when the trader has received a positive feedback herself under uniFW (such that only the other has 
received a negative feedback), the trader mainly conditions the agreement to withdraw on make-good 
behavior, and then follows through with the actual unilateral withdrawal (such that the latter is not 
correlated with make-good behavior anymore; see coefficients on “Quality improved” and “Payment 
improved” in the four right-hand side regressions in Table A.3.3). When the trader has received a negative 
feedback, we see slightly different patterns for buyers and sellers. For buyers, the agreement to allow 
withdrawal is significantly higher and less conditioned on make-good when the buyer had received a 
negative herself. Instead, the conditionality is moved to the unilateral second stage of the withdrawal 
decision, where the buyer is now more critical and more likely to condition on withdrawal. For sellers, we 
also observe a higher likelihood to (unconditionally) allow feedback withdrawal when the seller had 
received a negative herself, but we do not detect significant effects on conditionality and second-stage 
behavior. However, our analysis for sellers also relies on a much lower number of data points (see Table 
A.3.3). 
 
To sum up the detailed analysis of feedback and withdrawal behavior in this Appendix section, we find 
more detriment strategic behavior in the muFW as compared to the uniFW feedback systems. In both muFW 
and uniFW, when traders have given a negative feedback but have received a positive feedback themselves, 
they largely condition their agreement to feedback withdrawal on the make-good behavior of the other 
trader. When the traders have received a negative feedback themselves, then in both systems they are more 
likely to unconditionally agree to feedback withdrawal. However, while in muFW the mutual agreement 
automatically leads to the actual withdrawal, in uniFW traders have a second stage in the withdrawal 
process, where they unilaterally decide to actually withdraw the feedback or not. There we observe (at least 
for buyers, with too few observations for sellers) that traders move the conditionality to this second stage, 
preserving its incentive impact on make-good and cooperation. As a result of strategic anticipation of these 
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withdrawal behaviors, under muFW traders are more likely to give preemptive negative feedback in order 
to extort a withdrawal decision, something that is not possible under uniFW.  
 
TABLE A.3.3: PROBIT REGRESSION OF THE LIKELIHOOD TO WITHDRAW ON 
 OTHER’S MAKE-GOOD BEHAVIOR AND FEEDBACK CONDITION 
Treatment muFW  uniFW 
Dependent 
B withdraws 
y/n 
S withdraws 
y/n 
 B votes for 
WD option 
S votes for 
WD option 
B revises 
y/n 
S revises 
y/n 
Model (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Baseline B->S neg, S->B pos 
B->S pos, 
S->B neg 
 B->S neg, 
S->B pos 
B->S pos, 
S->B neg 
B->S neg, 
S->B pos 
B->S pos, 
S->B neg 
        
Quality improved y/n 0.332***   0.441***  0.110  
 [0.108]   [0.047]  [0.098]  
        
Payment improved y/n  0.436***   0.257**  0.267 
  [0.126]   [0.106]  [0.290] 
        
B->S neg, S: neg 0.266** 0.445***  0.308*** 0.342** -0.443*** -0.387 
 [0.126] [0.074]  [0.058] [0.137] [0.086] [0.252] 
        
B->S neg, S->B neg × 
Quality improved y/n 
-0.145   -0.281***    
[0.124]   [0.096]    
        
B: neg, S->B neg × 
Payment improved y/n 
 -0.088   0.207 0.187* 0.110 
 [0.176]   [0.127] [0.104] [0.324] 
        
N 739 429  696 178 449 78 
LL -426.0 218.1  -345.4 -105.7 -167.6 -34.8 
Notes: The table reports average marginal effects dy/dx with robust standard errors clustered at the matching group level, based 
on data from rounds 11-50 (omitting start and end effects). *, **, and ** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. 
 
 
  
 21 
Appendix B. Experimental instructions 
(translated from German original) 
 
Treatments: noFW/muFW/uniFW 
 
Instructions 
Welcome and thank you for participating in this experiment. In this experiment you can earn money. The specific 
amount depends on your decisions and the decisions of other participants. From now on until the end of the 
experiment, please do not communicate with other participants. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. 
An experimenter will come to your place and answer your question privately. In the experiment we use ECU 
(Experimental Currency Unit) as the monetary unit. At the end of the experiment your income will be converted 
from ECUs into Euros according to the conversion rate of 400 ECUs = 1 Euro, and paid out in cash jointly with your 
show-up fee of 2.50 Euros. 
At the beginning of the experiment, you will be randomly assigned to the role of a buyer or a seller. You will keep 
your role throughout the experiment. The experiment consists of 60 rounds. In each round the computer will 
randomly match pairs of one buyer and one seller. Additionally the computer will make sure that you are never 
matched with the same other participant twice in a row. At the beginning of the round, both the buyer and the seller 
are endowed with an amount of 100 ECU. Each round consists of [uniFW: 6][muFW: 5] [noFW: 4] stages: 
1. Trade decision: Simultaneously, the buyer and the seller decide whether they want to trade with each other. 
If one of them or both don’t want to trade, then the round ends at this stage, and the round income of buyer 
and seller equals their endowment.  
2. Money transfer and quality decision: The buyer decides to send his/her 100 ECU to the seller or not. At 
the same time, the seller chooses the quality of the product which s/he is sending to the buyer. The quality 
must be between 0% and 100%. Each quality percent costs the seller 1 ECU, and benefits the buyer by 3 
ECU. So, for example,  
• if the quality is 0%, the seller has costs of 0 ECU and the buyer receives a product value of 0 ECU; 
• if the quality is 50%, the seller has costs of 50 ECU and the buyer receives a product value of 150 
ECU; 
• and if the quality is 100%, the seller has costs of 100 ECU and the buyer receives a product value 
of 300 ECU. 
Once the buyer and seller made their decisions, both transaction partners are informed about each other’s 
choice. 
3. Feedback: Simultaneously, the buyer and the seller decide which feedback they want to submit on the 
transaction. The feedback can be either ‘negative’, or ‘positive’. After both have given feedback, it will be 
shown on the screen to both transaction partners. The received feedback will also be displayed to transaction 
partners in subsequent rounds (see below). 
4. Money transfer/quality revision: If the buyer did not send the 100 ECU in Stage 2, then s/he now receives 
the opportunity to revise this decision, and can once again decide to send the 100 ECU to the seller. 
Simultaneously, the seller has the opportunity to revise his/her quality decision in Stage 2. The revised quality 
has to be between the quality chosen in Stage 2 and 100%. Once both have made their revision decisions, 
they are informed about each other’s choices.  
5. [muFW: Feedback revision: This stage is only entered if at least one of the feedback ratings given in Stage 
3 was negative. Simultaneously, both the buyer and the seller can decide whether they support to revise the 
feedback and turn both feedback ratings into ‘positive’ feedback. If both support the revision, then both 
feedback ratings will be made ‘positive’. If only the buyer or only the seller or none supports the feedback 
revision, then the feedback given in Stage 3 remain unchanged.] [uniFW: Feedback revision option: This 
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stage is only entered if at least one of the feedback ratings given in Stage 3 was negative. Simultaneously, 
both the buyer and the seller can decide whether they support the option to revise feedback and turn ‘negative’ 
feedback ratings into ‘positive’ feedback. If both transaction partners support the revision option, both 
transaction partners can revise their feedback rating in stage 6 to "positive". If only the buyer or only the 
seller or none supports the feedback revision option, then the feedback given in Stage 3 remain unchanged.] 
6. [uniFW: Feedback revision: This stage is only entered if both transaction partners support the option to 
change feedback to "positive". Simultaneously, both the buyer and the seller can decide whether they they 
want to revise their feedback to "positive". Transaction partners who have already given a "positive" feedback 
rating in stage 3, cannot revise their feedback rating. Following the feedback revision, both transaction 
partners are informed of the other's decision.] 
 
After these [uniFW: 6][ [muFW: 5] [noFW: 4] stages the round ends. In the next round, you will be randomly 
matched to a new other buyer or seller, respectively. 
At the end of the round, both buyer and seller are informed about all the choices they made and their respective 
round payoffs and feedback. 
The round payoff of a buyer is  
100 ECU  
{ if both decided to trade: 
– 100 ECU if s/he decided to send the 100 ECU to the seller 
+ 3 * Q with Q equaling the quality percent the seller has chosen for the product, being between 0 and 100 
} 
The round payoff of a seller is 
100 ECU  
{ if both decided to trade: 
+ 100 ECU if the buyer decided to send the 100 ECU to the seller 
- Q with Q equaling the quality percent the s/he has chosen for the product, being between 0 and 100 
} 
Your final payoff from the experiment will be the sum of all round payoffs. 
The number of feedback ratings a participant collected in previous rounds will be shown to his transaction partner at 
the beginning of the next round, before Stage 1. The display will show the number of positive and negative feedback 
ratings received in previous rounds, like this: “X positive feedback ratings and Y negative feedback ratings received 
in previous rounds”. 
 
